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The Government Contractor Defense: Defending Boyle’s Analysis and Extending It Beyond the
Realm of Military Procurement Contracts
Eric M. Gonzalez ∗
I. Introduction
The government contractor defense has a long and conflicted history reaching back to the
Civil War era. The defense stands for the idea that a contractor working for the government,
who is provided limited discretion within its contract, should be entitled to share the
government’s immunity. An assortment of preceding cases ultimately prompted the Supreme
Court to issue a landmark decision in 1988: Boyle v. United Techs. Corp. 1 This decision
addressed the long-debated issue of whether or not a contractor, not an employee of the
government, should be allowed to share in the government’s sovereign immunity in favor of the
contractor. 2 This controversial decision invites speculation as to what governmental interests
could justify placing the burden of tort injuries entirely on the victims who suffer them. Not
surprisingly, courts and scholars alike remain split as to how this question should be answered.
The central dividing issue raised by the Supreme Court’s vague decision in Boyle is whether or
not immunity may be derived outside of the military context that shaped the Boyle analysis. 3
This Comment canvasses Boyle’s history, framing, and opinion, which are as muddled
and confusing as they are lengthy. Furthermore, this Comment will argue that despite vehement
criticism: 1) Boyle does not offend traditional notions of separation of powers, it instead upholds
them; 2) the creation of federal common law in Boyle was justified and consistent with
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precedent; 3) despite strong opposition from the Ninth Circuit 4, it is important that the
government contractor defense be allowed to extend beyond military procurement contracts.
Part II of this Comment will discuss and analyze the history of the defense leading up to
the Boyle decision, including a look at the seminal case Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co. 5,
and ending with a discussion of two cases that were instrumental in the Court’s analysis in Boyle.
Part III will examine the Boyle decision itself, with extensive analysis of Justice Brennan’s
tenacious dissent. Part IV will argue that Boyle is consistent with separation of powers and
federal common law principles, despite strong arguments to the contrary.
Part V will then examine the impact of the Boyle decision on federal courts and the
resulting circuit split, looking at and analyzing both majority and minority viewpoints. Lastly,
Part VI will argue that Boyle should be embraced in nonmilitary contexts. This section will
examine the strong federal interests and conflicting state law that support the basis for this
argument. Furthermore, this section will show that Congress is not best equipped to legislate on
such matters, and that the Supreme Court should adopt a modified test.
II. The History of the Government Contractor Defense
The government contractor defense has roots that trace back to cases from the mid 1800s.
These cases generally stand for the proposition that an agent obeying, working for, or working
under the lawful command of the federal government cannot be held liable for the injuries to
third parties resulting from that work. As this historical analysis will demonstrate, these early
cases, which form the foundation for the Court’s decision in Boyle, derive from both military and
non-military contexts. As such, these cases are critical for a complete understanding of the
arguments that follow.

4
5

See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
309 U.S. 18 (1940).
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A. Decisions pre-dating Yearsley
Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co. serves as a very early example of
the Supreme Court exculpating a private party for actions taken under the lawful edicts of the
federal government. 6 The dispute arose after two individuals claimed title to a particular parcel
of land. 7 The defendant had acquired title to the property through a levy of an execution to
enforce a “distress warrant” that was issued by the United States Treasury. 8 Stressing that the
defendant had acquired the land through what was found to be a valid act of Congress, the Court
held that defendant could not be held judicially accountable for acquiring property that had been
legally seized: “[h]e cannot be made responsible in a judicial tribunal for obeying the lawful
command of the government; and the government itself, which gave the command, cannot be
sued without its own consent.” 9
Other early cases demonstrate the inclination of the Supreme Court to provide a shield
against liability and redress for those working under the orders of the federal government. For
example, in Lamar v. Browne the Court examined orders issued by a colonel to his troops during
the Civil War to seize the cotton of a neighboring farm after hostilities had ended. 10 The Court
not only upheld the seizure itself, but also stressed that the soldiers involved in carrying those
orders could not be exposed to civil suit. 11 Instead, the Court maintained that if there was any

6

Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. 272 (1856).
Id. at 274
8
Id. The distress warrant in question was issued when the federal government had learned that a previous owner was
indebted to the United States government, and accordingly under an act of Congress the land was seized under that
instrument to satisfy the debt and was subsequently sold to the defendant. Id. at 274–75. The plaintiff, who had
acquired title through a levy of an execution (court order), challenged the act on constitutional grounds. Id. See, e.g.,
Joshua I. Schwartz, Nonaqcuiescence, Crowell v. Benson, and Administrative Adjudication, 77 GEO. L.J. 1815,
1839 (1989).
9
Murray’s Lessee, 59 U.S. at 283.
10
Lamar v. Browne, 92 U.S. 187 (1876).
11
Id. at 199.
7
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action available to the owner of the cotton for conversion, it would have to be brought against the
United States and not those carrying out the orders of the sovereign they serve. 12
This position was later affirmed in a similar case that took place at the turn of the
twentieth century: The Paquete Habana. 13 While this case is factually similar to Lamar in that it
involves the capture of private property during a time of war, it differs in that the actions taken
by those following the orders of the federal government were not legally conferred.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court maintained that no suit could be brought against individuals
taking wrongful action following the commands of their sovereign, and that instead action must
be brought against the sovereign itself, if anyone: “we are not aware that it is disputed that when
the act of a public officer is authorized or has been adopted by the sovereign power, whatever the
immunities of the sovereign, the agent thereafter cannot be pursued.” 14
B. The Yearsley decision and its application, leading up to Boyle
The cases above, and the principles developed therein, culminated in the seminal
Supreme Court case Yearsley v. W.A. Ross Constr. Co. 15 This case involved the liability of a
private contractor working for the government on a contract to build dikes in the Mississippi
River in an effort to make the waters more navigable, as was contemplated in an act of
Congress. 16 In addition to building dikes, the contractor also used paddles and pumps that
consequentially eroded land belonging to the plaintiff, ultimately providing the plaintiff with a
cause of action. 17 The Supreme Court succinctly stated that the named defendant, the contractor
working for the government, could not be held responsible for damages sustained in pursuit of a
12

Id.
The Paquete Habana, 189 U.S. 453 (1903). Here soldiers were involved in the capture of fishing boats; however
the Court had previously found that vessels engaged in coastal fishing for the daily market could not legally be
captured. Id. at 464.
14
Id. at 465 (citing Lamar, 92 U.S. at 199).
15
Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Constr. Co., 309 U.S. 18 (1940); see supra text accompanying notes 5–13.
16
Id. at 19.
17
Id.
13
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lawful contract assigned by the government, and that claims, if any existed, must be brought
against the government itself:
[I]n the case of a taking by the Government of private property for public use
such as petitioners allege here, it cannot be doubted that the remedy to obtain
compensation from the Government is as comprehensive as the requirement of the
Constitution, and hence it excludes liability of the Government’s representatives
lawfully acting on its behalf in relation to the taking. 18
There are two subtle aspects to this case that must be noted here. First, the contractor
working for the government was working on a service contract not related to any kind of military
affair. This is important because it is crucial that the reader understand that the origins of the
government contractor defense lie outside of the scope of military procurement contracts to
which the Ninth Circuit believes the Boyle decision is limited.19 Second, the Court stressed that
the contractor was “lawfully acting on [the Government’s] behalf.” 20 This is an important point,
because it helps bolster the argument that not only was the majority’s analysis in Boyle correct,
but also that the Boyle decision is a valid creation of federal common law. 21
The Yearsley decision was rendered in 1940 and the Court did not reach its conclusions
in Boyle until 1988. As such, an examination of the defense as applied in the intervening 48
years is necessary in order to paint a more complete picture of the defense as it exists today.
Ogden River Water Users’ Asso. v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy is a case that is factually
similar to Yearsley. 22 Pursuant to a contract with the federal government, the defendant began
stripping an existing dam in preparation for construction contemplated by the terms of the
contract with the government. 23 The Water User’s Association then brought an action claiming

18

Id. at 22.
See infra p. 23.
20
Id.
21
See infra p. 19–21.
22
Ogden River Water Users’ Asso. v. Weber Basin Water Conservancy, 238 F.2d 936 (10th Cir. 1956).
23
Id. at 939–40.
19
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equitable title to the dam. 24 The Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court’s decision to dismiss the
claims against the defendant, finding that if granting relief against the contractor would
necessarily result in the same relief against the federal government, then the federal government
would be considered a necessary party and the action would not stand without the sovereign’s
consent. 25
Later in Woods v. Wright, the Fifth Circuit, while not directly applying the government
contractor defense, did affirm and apply a crucial aspect of the Yearsley opinion: that those
acting under lawful orders of the government will not be held accountable in lieu of the
sovereign that issued those orders. 26 Woods dealt with the decision of a public school
superintendent to suspend an African-American pupil. 27 Based on this principle, that court
found that the decision of the lower court to dismiss must be reversed holding that “[w]here the
direction of a superior to a subordinate has been illegally given, the latter may be restrained
without joinder of the former.” 28 While immunity was ultimately not granted in this case, it is
important to understand that the Fifth Circuit refused to do so because the order had been
illegally given, which distinguishes this particular case from Yearsley. Regardless, the courts
analysis is still insightful in that it otherwise acknowledges Yearsley.
In the decade leading up to the Boyle decision it became clear that the government
contractor defense had developed a clear foothold in the realm of federal common law. The
Third Circuit made this abundantly clear by stating that “federal common law provides a defense
to liabilities incurred in the performance of government contracts.” 29 In re All Maine Asbestos

24

Id.
Id. at 941.
26
Woods v. Wright, 334 F.2d 369, 374 (5th Cir. 1964).
27
Id. at 370–71.
28
Id. at 374 (citing Yearsley v. W. A. Ross Construction Co., 309 U.S. 18, 60 (1940) (emphasis added)).
29
Koutsoubos v. Boeing Vertol, Div. of Boeing Co., 755 F.2d 352, 354 (3d Cir. 1985).
25
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Litigation serves as another example, as a federal district court in Maine acknowledged the
strong policy grounds for supporting the defense, such as assuring “efficient management of
government procurement contracts”, as the effect of imposing liability on these contractors
would frustrate the ability of the government to acquire the products that it seeks. 30
C. The In re “Agent Orange” and McKay decisions
In 1982 the Eastern District of New York proposed a test in In re “Agent Orange” Prod.
Liab. Litig. that intended to specify exactly what the defendant would have to prove in order to
qualify for the government contractor defense. 31 The first prong of the test required that the
military have established the specifications for the product, in this case “Agent Orange.” 32 The
second prong of the test required the contractor’s product to conform to the military’s
specifications in all material respects. 33 The most important policy justification for these two
prongs was that the court did not want to impose a requirement on suppliers (contractors) to
question the military’s needs, regardless of the risks associated with that product. 34 This policy
justification is buttressed by the third and final prong of the test that asks that the government
know as much as the contractor, or more, about the dangers associated with the product. 35 This
final prong was designed to ensure that the contractor would not be insulated from liability in

30

In re All Maine Asbestos Litigation, 575 F. Supp. 1375, 1379 (D. Me. 1983). This court ultimately did not decide
whether these policy grounds were sufficient for Maine to adopt the government contractor defense. The court was,
however, careful to acknowledge countervailing policy arguments that existed at that time. Id. at 1380. In particular
the court noted that a countervailing policy would support placing risk of loss on contractors who can acquire
insurance and indemnification as opposed to innocent third parties who would now bear all the risk. Id. at 1381
(citing McKay v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., 704 F. 2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983) (Alarcon, J., dissenting)). See also In re
“Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 534 F. Supp 1046 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); McKay, 704 F.2d 444. These cases will be
further discussed in section C.
31
In re “Agent Orange”, 534 F. Supp at 1054.
32
Id. at 1055.
33
Id.
34
Id. at 1054.
35
Id. at 1055.
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instances where it knows of dangers that the government does not, but nevertheless chooses not
to disclose those dangers. 36
The In re “Agent Orange” test ultimately formed the basis for the decision reached in
Boyle. As such, two points must be noted here. First, the Eastern District of New York proposed
a test that was clearly designed to fit into a military procurement mold. 37 It is therefore crucial
that any change in the test made by the Supreme Court be carefully scrutinized, as this could
potentially suggest a desire to apply the test outside of that particular context. Second, it is
unclear why that particular court wanted to limit the test it proposed to a military procurement
context, as “Agent Orange” is not a weapon in the ordinary sense of the word, and its
connections with the military are thus not entirely clear. With this ambiguity in mind, it is
helpful to examine the Ninth Circuit’s decision in McKay v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., which also
proposes an alternate test to the one proposed in In re “Agent Orange”. 38
McKay, which is factually similar to Boyle 39, dealt with a wrongful death action arising
out of two unrelated crashes of naval aircraft that were designed by the defendant contractor
pursuant to a contract with the United States Navy. 40 Both aircraft utilized a particular escape
system that was designed to eject passengers into the air. 41 Autopsies of both pilots revealed that
their deaths were most likely the result of injuries sustained while being ejected from their
respective aircrafts. 42 Utilizing the Feres-Stencel doctrine, 43 the Ninth Circuit proposed a four

36

Id.
For example, the requirement that the government provide product specifications appears to preclude nonprocurement contracts, i.e. service contracts.
38
McKay v. Rockwell Int’l. Corp., 704 F.2d 444 (9th Cir. 1983).
39
See generally infra p. 10.
40
McKay, 704 F.2d at 446.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
The Feres-Stencel doctrine is derived from two Supreme Court decisions, Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135
(1950) and Stencel Aero Engineering Corp. v. United States, 431 U.S. 666 (1977). The doctrine provides that the
federal government cannot be held liable under the Federal Tort Claims Act for injuries sustained by military
37
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prong test that would provide immunity for contactors against liability arising under section
402A of the Restatement (Second) of Torts 44 when:
(1) the United States is immune from liability under
Feres and Stencel, (2) the supplier proves that the United States
established, or approved, reasonably precise specifications for the
allegedly defective military equipment, (3) the equipment
conformed to those specifications, and (4) the supplier warned the
United States about patent errors in the government's specifications
or about dangers involved in the use of the equipment that were
known to the supplier but not to the United States. 45
This test is distinguishable from the test proposed in In re “Agent Orange” in two
important ways. First, while the test in McKay appears to be very similar to the test in In re
“Agent Orange”, the language actually used by the Ninth Circuit is materially different. For
instance, while the McKay test would require that the government provide or approve reasonably
precise specifications in the second prong, 46 the first prong of the In re “Agent Orange” test
would require that the government have actually provided those specifications. 47 Second, and
more importantly, the Supreme Court purports to adopt the McKay test in Boyle, so the decision
to omit the first prong of that test, which invokes the Feres-Stencel doctrine, demonstrates that
the Supreme Court ultimately found that limited military framework too restrictive.
III. Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation
In 1988 the Supreme Court finally responded to the previously discussed cases, leading to
the official creation of the government contractor defense. In 1983 David Boyle, a Marine
helicopter pilot, was piloting a helicopter during routine training exercises. 48 Lt. Boyle’s

personnel that occur incident to service, nor can the federal government indemnify a contractor who has paid
damages to military personnel for injuries sustained incident to service. See Terrie Hanna, Note, The Government
Contractor defense and the Impact of Boyle v. United Technologies Corporation, 70 B.U.L. REV. 691, 696 (1990).
44
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965).
45
McKay, 704 F.2d at 451.
46
Id.
47
See supra page 7.
48
Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 502 (1988).
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helicopter crashed just off the coast of Virginia Beach, Virginia. 49 While he survived the initial
impact, Lt. Boyle ultimately drowned when he was unable to open the hatch, which had been
designed to open outward instead of inward. 50 This questionable design, coupled with the
extreme pressure of the water external to the submerged helicopter, made escape impossible. 51
Lt. Boyle’s father brought a wrongful death action against United Technologies Corporation, the
independent contractor, under two different theories of state tort law liability: first, that the
defendant had defectively repaired a device that led to the initial crash; second, that the
emergency escape system was defectively designed. 52 One of the defenses raised by the
defendant contractor in this case was the government contractor defense.
A. Justice Scalia’s Majority Opinion
This case resulted in a 5-4 split, with Justice Scalia delivering the majority opinion and
upholding the use of the government contractor defense. The petitioner challenged the defense
on three grounds: 1) there is no federal common law that shields contractors working for the
government; 53 2) the reviewing appellate court (Fourth Circuit) did not formulate proper
conditions for the defense to apply; 54 3) even if the appellate court had established proper
conditions for the defense to apply, the question should have been left to the jury to decide
whether the conditions had been met. 55 The majority systematically dismissed these three
challenges; however, only the first two will be discussed, as they are the only issues relevant to
this Comment. The third argument merely served as grounds for remand. 56

49

Id.
Id.
51
Id. at 503.
52
Id. at 503.
53
Id. at 504.
54
Boyle, 486 U.S. at 513.
55
Id. at 514.
56
Id. at 514.
50
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With respect to the petitioner’s first challenge, Justice Scalia maintained that while
federal courts are reluctant to “pre-empt” 57 state law with federal common law absent clear
statutory prescription, “uniquely federal interests” can justify the replacement of state law with
federal law. 58 The majority found two uniquely federal interests in this case: first, that the rights
and obligations of the government under its contracts be governed exclusively by federal law; 59
and second, that the federal officials working for the government be protected from civil
liability. 60 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the issue before the Court did not directly
contemplate either the federal government or a federal official; however he found that the
principles in Yearsley firmly suggest that such interests extend to the contractors that work for
the federal government. 61 Justice Scalia further posited that a conflict between a uniquely
federal interest and state law does not need to be as extreme in degree as pre-emption doctrine
would require, 62 but that a “significant conflict” with state law must nevertheless exist. 63 In this
particular case, the Court found that Virginia state law imposing tort liability for failing to equip
non-defectively designed escape hatches was entirely contrary to the federal interests involved in
57

Justice Scalia’s choice of words is somewhat misleading. Courts have a tendency to mix up the doctrines of
displacement and pre-emption, and they are therefore sometimes used interchangeably. Kyle G. Grimm,
"Endangerment" of the Common Law: Do Rulemakings as to Greenhouse Gases Under the Clean Air Act Displace
Federal Common-Law Claims for the Public Nuisance of Global Warming?, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 671, 679
(2011). Pre-emption occurs when a federal statute supersedes state law, whereas displacement occurs when a
federal statute governs subject matter that was previously governed by federal common law. Id. Federal common
law and state common law are considered mutually exclusive, and therefore whenever state common law is
sufficient, federal common law cannot be applied. Id. at 680. In cases where state common law is insufficient, such
as where a uniquely federal interest is at stake, courts recognize that they may apply federal common law in
instances where a federal statute will not be enough to address the question at hand. Id. With this in mind, it would
seem that displacement is the more relevant doctrine. Displacement does, of course, raise genuine separation of
powers issues as federal statutes, created by the legislature, necessarily conflict with federal common law, a product
of the judicial branch of government. These concerns will be addressed in Part IV.
58
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 504.
59
Id. at 505 (citing United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 592–94 (1973)).
60
Id. (citing Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292, 295 (1988)).
61
Id. at 505–06.
62
Congress legislating in areas traditionally occupied by the states, for instance.
63
Id. at 507. At this point the majority cites to instances where there has not been a “hard” conflict that has
nonetheless proven sufficient for federal interests to prevail over state law. For instance, where federal interests
would require a uniform rule, state law will be replaced by federal rules. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318
U.S. 363, 366–67 (1943).

11

setting the terms of the contracts that the government enters into; because the discretionary
functions of the federal government would be impeded, a significant conflict existed. 64
Justice Scalia elaborated by stating that there are statutory grounds for perceiving a
“significant conflict” between a federal interest and state law in this case. 65 In particular, Justice
Scalia points to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) which Congress enacted to authorize third
parties to seek damages for the negligent harm caused by government employees except where
the claim is based on the government’s performance of, or failure to perform, a discretionary
function. 66 Perceiving design choices to be clearly a discretionary function of the military,
Justice Scalia instead focused on the policy ground for Congress’s inclusion of this section of the
FTCA: limiting the financial burden placed on the government in performing discretionary
functions, because doing otherwise would cause harmful judicial second guessing. 67 The
majority in this case reasoned that allowing suit against contractors in these kinds of cases would
ultimately defeat this purpose of the FTCA, in part because contractors would pass the increased
costs resulting from liability onto the government. 68 The majority therefore concluded that in the
realm of discretionary governmental functions, the imposition of state tort law significantly
conflicted with the federal interest of limiting financial tort liability.
The next argument raised by the petitioner is that the Fourth Circuit had failed to state or
apply the proper test for the government contractor defense. 69 This contention is arguably the
most important one that the petitioner raised, because it forced the Supreme Court to determine
the proper test to apply, and to state the proper policy grounds behind its decision. The majority

64

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 507.
Id. at 511.
66
28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (2012).
67
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 511
68
Id.
69
Id. at 513.
65
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began its analysis here by asserting the importance of the government contractor defense and
general policy grounds in support of it. In particular, the court affirmed the test used by the
Fourth Circuit in McKay 70and found that the first two prongs of the test ensure that the claim is
related to the performance of a “discretionary function” of the government, and not left to the
discretion of the contractor performing the work. 71 The third prong of the test was justified
because contractors may feel tempted to withhold knowledge of the risks associated with a
project if tort liability is not a factor. 72 In other words, this prong assures, in theory, that the
risks associated with a project are known by both a contractor and the government, therefore
allowing the government to rethink, at its discretion, its design specifications before committing
to any contract. While the Court states that this test is the same adopted by the Ninth Circuit, it
must be noted that the test does not contain the Feres factor used by that circuit in the previously
discussed In re “Agent Orange” decision. 73 This therefore serves as further evidence that the
Court did not intend for Boyle to apply only to military procurement cases.
B. Justice Brennan’s Dissent
In dissent, Justice Brennan attacked the decision reached by the majority of the court on
several grounds. This section will critically analyze them. First, Justice Brennan attacked the
decision on separation of powers grounds. Justice Brennan then proceeded to question the
majority’s decision on federalism principles. Third, Brennan questioned the federal interest
argument raised by Scalia in the majority opinion. Lastly, Brennan criticized the majority’s

70

See supra p. 7. To reiterate, the three prongs of the government contractor defense are as follows: 1) the
government provided reasonably precise specifications; 2) the equipment conformed to those specifications; 3) the
supplier warns the government of known design defects or dangers.
71
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 512.
72
Id. at 512.
73
See supra p. 9 and accompanying notes. The exclusion of this factor is crucial for any argument suggesting that
the Supreme Court did not intend for this test to apply only to military procurement cases, as the inclusion of that
prong would clearly require otherwise.
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reliance on the Yearsley decision. These four arguments raised by Brennan will be
systematically examined.
Brennan began by positing that the immunity conferred by the majority in the decision is
the kind that should be left to Congress, or in other words, those officials elected by the people. 74
A separation of powers argument is raised, for “‘[w]hatever the merits of the policy’ the Court
wishes to implement, ‘its conversion into law is a proper subject for congressional action, not for
any creative power of [the judiciary].’” 75 In support of his argument, Brennan posited that if
Congress shared the will of the majority and desired to grant immunity to contractors in such a
position, then it would have legislated on the matter and not remained silent. 76 In support of this
argument Justice Brennan pointed to past efforts made by lobbyists to achieve exactly what the
majority has done in this case. 77 Justice Brennan missed the mark in this argument, however, as
sometimes Congress will choose not to legislate in circumstances where it fears that any welldefined statute may prove to be too narrow, especially in cases where it is impossible to foresee
all the possible contexts in which the issue may arise. 78 Under such circumstances, Congress
may instead choose to leave broadly applicable statutes for the courts to interpret and apply, as
was done here with the FTCA. 79
Next, Justice Brennan proceeded to make a federalism argument by citing Erie 80 and
stating that there is no general federal common law, and that displacement of state law can only

74

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515.
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 515 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301, 314–15
(1947)).
76
Id. at 530. See infra note 96.
77
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 531.
78
Cf. Erin L. Massey, Control Person Liability Under Section 20(A): Striking a Balance of Interests for Plaintiffs
and Defendants, 6 HOUS. BUS. & TAX L. J. 109, 112–13 (2005).
79
Id.
80
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). This case stands for the proposition that federal courts do not have the
power to create federal common law when hearing claims involving state law brought in diversity. This doctrine is
not strictly adhered to, however.
75
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be justified when the Constitution or acts of Congress are on point. 81 Brennan did, however,
acknowledge precedent that allows strong federal interests to pre-empt state law without some
statutory backing such as “rights and obligations of the United States, interstate and international
disputes implicating conflicting rights of states or out relations with foreign nations, and
admiralty cases.” 82
Justice Brennan’s third contention was that the federal interests proposed under the
FTCA are not justified as the FTCA is narrowly applied, primarily to the federal employees
contemplated by the Act. 83 What is interesting about this point is that it boils down to statutory
interpretation, and whether the will of Congress can be interpreted as placing government tort
immunity above the interests of private citizens. Brennan cited numerous cases at this point that
have shown a trend to place the interests of individually harmed citizens above that of the
government, except in extreme circumstances. 84 But Brennan is not advocating the words of his
own dissent here, for if it is for the lawmakers to frame federal immunity in statute, then these
cited cases cannot supersede that will of the lawmakers. 85 If the FTCA and Congress’s will can
fairly be interpreted to apply to contractors, as the purpose of immunity would be frustrated
otherwise, 86 then these cases lose their value in this particular context.
Lastly, Brennan criticized the majority’s reliance on Yearsley. Brennan believed it was
unlikely that the opinion was meant to extend beyond the Takings Clause context of that
particular decision. 87 Brennan, however, ignores the history of the government contractor

81

Boyle, 487 U.S. at 517 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Id. (citing Texas Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 640 (1981)).
83
Id. at 522.
84
Id. at 523.
85
See supra pages 13–14.
86
This would be the case because the costs imposed on the government through tort liability inflicted on the
contractors working for the government would be vicariously raised. See supra page 11.
87
Boyle, 487 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
82
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defense, which clearly shows a trend to apply the defense outside of a Takings Clause context. 88
In addition, Brennan raised a point here that seems to support the broadening of the defense: “the
contractor in Yearsley was following, not formulating, the Government’s specifications, and (as
far as is relevant here) followed them correctly.” 89 This seems to suggest application of the
defense in the realms of services, albeit with little contractor discretion, is not only plausible, but
backed by precedent. 90
IV. Boyle is consistent with separation of powers principles
and is a valid creation of federal common law
A. Separation of powers
There are three ways in which one can articulate the separation of powers issues raised in
the Boyle decision. First, one could argue that the Supreme Court in Boyle has violated notions
of horizontal separation of powers by introducing federal common law in a realm that should be
exclusively left to Congress. Second, one could argue that Boyle actually stands for vertical
separation of powers 91 because it prevents state courts and legislatures from stepping on the toes
of the federal government and its “unique federal interests”. Lastly, and related to the first two
arguments, both horizontal and vertical separation of powers arguments can be made against
both federal and state courts/ legislatures based on article I, section 8 grounds.
Article I, section 8 entrusts Congress with the power to make law when necessary and
proper. 92 Therefore, if the judiciary is charged with acting as a lawmaker, serious separation of
powers issues are raised. It has long been accepted that while the judges are not lawmakers in
88
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the ordinary sense, federal courts are empowered to create federal common law in areas where
Congress has been found to be silent. 93 The threshold question then becomes whether this
constitutes an area that Congress has been silent on.
It is argued that Congress has indeed spoken on contractor immunity in the context of
working with the military, and therefore the Boyle majority is clearly lawmaking where Congress
has already legislated. 94 In particular, 10 U.S.C. §2354 gives the secretary of the relevant
military department power to grant immunity to contractors from liability against third parties in
tort. 95 Numerous other statutory examples of immunity granted by the government in very
particular contexts can be found. 96 The argument that these particular statutes demonstrate
Congress speaking on the subject contemplated by the Boyle decision, however, is flawed for
two reasons. First, it is evident from the these statutes that Congress has found occasion to
legislate in very particular circumstances, and therefore because of the unique and particular
consideration involved in such legislating, it would hardly make sense to claim that Congress has
spoken on liability outside of such particular contexts by choosing not to legislate, especially if
one considers the monumental burden placed on Congress of trying to conceive of every possible
instance where immunity should be conferred. 97 Second, this point assumes that the Boyle
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decision is limited to product liability in the military context, as the cited statutes, particularly 10
U.S.C. §2354, are limited to that particular realm of contract agreements. If the Boyle decision
is to be, and was intended to be, applied outside of that particular context, then such statutes do
not serve as evidence of Congress speaking on the issues addressed in the Boyle decision.
Instead these statutes only serve as evidence of Congress finding particular instances where
immunity should absolutely be granted.
Furthermore, the issue addressed in Boyle pertains to government procurement, which is
inherently different than the “typical consumer transaction for which modern products liability
law was fashioned”. 98 In other words, the considerations before Congress when enacting
legislation on matters of tort and product liability are inherently different than the considerations
before the Court in Boyle. These differences exist because the federal government, unlike the
typical consumer, has the resources needed in order to make more informed decisions about the
products it acquires. 99 In addition the federal government, unlike the typical consumer, has great
bargaining power in deciding who it deals with, and how it will deal with them. 100 As such it is
less likely that the Court’s government contractor defense as created in Boyle encroaches upon
tort law that is passed under vastly different considerations.
Not only is the Boyle decision consistent with horizontal separation of powers, it is
exemplary of federalism principles as the decision aims to resolve conflict between state law and
federal interests. Indeed the Boyle decision prevented states from interfering with Congress’
express power over military affairs under article I, section 8. 101 As a preliminary matter, courts
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are not entrusted with the responsibility of running the military. 102 It would therefore be entirely
inappropriate for a state court, a court having nothing to do with the federal government, to
impact military policy even if this impact is imposed vicariously on the contractors working for
the military. This idea may not be intuitively clear and obvious, as it may be difficult to
understand how a state subjecting private contractors to tort liability shapes military policy.
To elucidate, when contractors are subjected to liability for any of the military contracts
that they enter into, two consequences directly impact the military: 1) contract costs will rise
because contractors will need to be covered by more expensive insurance; 103 and 2) because of
the amount of design, engineering, and expertise involved with military contracts, often with
conflicting goals of safety and combat efficiency, contractors may feel hesitant to engage in
contracts with the military where safety is second to efficiency, thus affecting cohesion between
the two contracting parties. 104 While the majority uses this point to justify the use of the FTCA
as a basis for conferring immunity, this point is also strongly consistent with federalism
principles. 105
B. Federal common law and unique federal interests
State laws “should be overridden by the federal courts only where clear and substantial
interests of the National Government, which cannot be served consistently with respect for such
state interests, will suffer major damage if the state law is applied.” 106 Pre-emption analysis will
change when there is a dominant federal interest that is so strong that there must be an
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assumption of preclusion of state law. 107 In other words, when there is a strong federal interest
at hand, the analysis changes from one that ordinarily disallows preclusion to an analysis that
allows it. 108 It is clear that in his dissent Brennan acknowledges the ability of courts to create
federal common law, albeit in rare and limited circumstances. Where Justice Brennan disagrees
with the majority is on whether any sufficient federal interest has been posited by the majority
that justifies the creation of federal common law here. 109
To argue this point, Justice Brennan notes that the majority does not rely on any federal
interests held sufficient in the past for the creation of federal common law. 110 Instead, Brennan
perceives the federal interests proposed by the majority as being a synthesis of interests arising
out of two cases that predate Erie, seemingly limiting their relevance. 111 In particular, these
interests are administering the rights and obligations of the United States in its contracts and
regulating liability of federal officials performing their duties, which Justice Brennan maintains
has never been extended beyond the federal government and its employees. 112 The interests
cited by Justice Brennan and the majority that are criticized as being antiquated have found
application in many cases long after the Court’s holding in Erie, however. 113 The long and wellestablished history of such interests serve to enforce the notion that they are paramount to the
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proper operation of the federal government. Furthermore, Brennan suggests that federal interests
are static notions that cannot be altered, changed, or manifested out of present necessity. 114
Lastly, it is important to note that a unique federal interest is only the first step of
justifying the creation of federal common law, as it is a necessary, but not a sufficient condition
for displacing state law. 115 In order to displace state law, there must also be a conflicting federal
policy or statute. 116 As has already been discussed in part, the majority uses the FTCA to
establish a statutory basis, and looks primarily at the financial burden to be placed on the
government in the event that contractors are held liable under their contracts with the
government, which would frustrate the goals of the FTCA in conferring immunity in the first
place. 117 Justice Brennan heavily criticizes the majority’s reliance on this conclusion while
accepting the general premise because he perceives these added costs to lack any evidentiary
support. 118
V. The impact of Boyle and resulting circuit split
Boyle left many questions unresolved. These questions, involving the decision’s scope
and applicability in different contexts, have generated several circuit splits. 119 Some may feel
inclined to interpret the three-prong test established in Boyle as clearly limiting the ruling to
military procurement contracts, but in reality the most crucial aspect of the decision is whether
subjecting the contractor to liability would frustrate a uniquely federal interest. 120 Because
uniquely federal interests are not limited to the military context, it follows that Boyle applies
outside of that particular context. Acknowledging this, however, raises the question of what
114
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specific test reviewing courts must apply absent the military procurement framework. Several
courts have discussed these possibilities.
A. The limits of the Boyle analysis
In Hudgens v. Bell Helicopter/Textron, the Eleventh Circuit was faced with a set of facts
not entirely dissimilar from Boyle. 121 Two navy pilots brought a negligence action against a
maintenance company that the United States had contracted with to maintain its helicopters. 122
The maintenance crew had failed to uncover cracks in the tail fin, which led to an accident. 123
What should first be noted about this case is that while it still applies in a military context, it
deals with service instead of procurement. The Hudgens court treats the ruling in Boyle as not
being an “all-or-nothing” set of rules regarding what kinds of contracts the analysis applies to. 124
The court instead asks whether subjecting the defendant to liability would interfere with a unique
federal interest. 125 The court holds that the defense applies to a service contract where a
contractor is tasked with following maintenance protocols when working on military aircraft, or
in other words, where the government has dictated the protocol to be followed. 126 This court
restructures the test to fit maintenance procedures instead of design specification, thus
demonstrating the malleability of the test.
The Eleventh Circuit placed great emphasis on the fact that the federal interest was the
same as it was in Boyle, and that this federal interest directly conflicted with state law. 127 In
particular, the court believed that subjecting contractors working for the government on service
contracts to liability would threaten the government’s discretion in determining how its fleets are
121
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to be maintained. This is because the contractor would, in theory, question or disobey
government orders regarding how maintenance is to be conducted if that individual contractor
perceives what it thinks is a better, or safer, method, even if the government believes it is
justified in requiring its methods. Therefore the Eleventh Circuit stated that a contractor in a
services contract will possess immunity if: 1) the contractor utilized reasonably precise
maintenance procedures; 2) the contractor’s performance conformed to those specified
procedures; 3) the United States was warned of any dangers that the contractor knew regarding
the specified procedures. 128 This test is very similar to the Boyle test in that it assures that the
contractor has limited discretion when working with the government.
The Ninth Circuit has taken a position that is entirely opposed to that of the Eleventh
Circuit and its advocates. In Nielsen v. George Diamond Vogel Paint Co. Ronald Nielson,
employed by the United States Army Corps of Engineers, was tasked with painting a dam in
Idaho. 129 Thereafter, Mr. Nielson experienced changes in behavior, depression, and various
other pains, all attributable to permanent brain damage. He sued the paint manufacturer alleging
that the paint caused his brain damage. 130 In short, this case dealt with injuries sustained by a
civilian using a product that was not designed for any particular military use. 131 In considering
the question of immunity, the Ninth Circuit viewed the displacement of a federal interest by state
law as a necessary condition, but not a sufficient one. 132 The Ninth Circuit focused on the
importance of the Feres doctrine in the Supreme Court’s analysis in Boyle and determined that
Boyle was limited to military procurement contracts: the “reasons for shielding. . . are the same
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as those underlying the Feres doctrine. These are considerations peculiar to the military
field.” 133
The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning, however, is misguided. The mere fact that the Court used
a doctrine related to the military field in its analysis of an issue related to the military should not
be considered evidence that the analysis was limited. 134 The use of the Feres doctrine in Boyle
was limited and only useful in framing the analysis, becayse Nielsen dealt with a military matter.
In addition, it must again be stressed that the Supreme Court molded its test after the test
proposed in McKay, but rejected the Feres prong. The Ninth Circuit’s reliance on Feres in any
application of the government contractor defense is therefore misplaced.
Carley v. Wheeled Coach, a case decided by the Third Circuit, was the first to truly
support expansion of the Boyle analysis beyond the military context. 135 This case dealt with a
plaintiff who sustained injuries when an ambulance that he was inside of tipped over. 136 The
defendant contractor in this case built the ambulance according to specifications set out by the
United States General Services Administration. 137 This plaintiff alleged that the design of the
vehicle made it top-heavy and prone to tipping. 138 The Third Circuit understood Boyle to stand
for the idea that federal interests exist in all government contracts of limited discretion, and not
just those within the military field. 139 The court proceeded to highlight federal interests that it
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believed exist outside the zone of military procurement that nevertheless merit the defense. 140
The Third Circuit also concluded that, in couching its decision in the military context, the
Supreme Court was merely answering the narrow question before it, as opposed to precluding
application of the defense in other contexts. 141 The court also affirmed the use of deference in
Boyle as being a necessary prerequisite in order to justify using the FTCA for statutory
backing. 142
Judge Becker submitted an opinion, concurring in part and dissenting in part., suggesting
that the extension of Boyle outside of that military context would be an encroachment upon both
Congress and the states. 143 While Judge Becker agreed that there are strong federal interests in
contracts outside the military context, he emphasized that this was only the first question to be
asked, and that a significant conflict with state law must be found. 144 Judge Becker believed that
the question was ultimately one of degree, and that conflict in nonmilitary contracts with state
law would not prove significant enough to warrant displacing state law. 145 Other academic
authorities have since agreed with Judge Becker and insist that without a federal policy as strong
as the national security concerns implicated in military matters, the government contractor
defense cannot be found applicable. 146 These criticisms, however, lose focus of the fact that the
FTCA serves as a statute implicating strong policy concerns, namely the importance in
unfettered governmental discretion, which justify immunity. In addition the case was ultimately
140

Id. at 1124. For instance, the defense is useful in preventing judicial second-guessing for the government’s public
policy decisions, and limited the government’s financial burdens. Carley, 991 F.2d at 1124.
141
Id. at 1124–25.
142
Id. at 1125.
143
Id. at 1128 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Essentially this dissent raises separation of
powers and federalism issues.
144
Id. at 1129 (Becker, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
145
Carley, 991 F.2d at 1130. Judge Becker came to this conclusion because state tort law conflicting with the
military would essentially boil down to a conflict of safety v. national security. Id. Judge Becker would suggest that
without national security concerns offsetting safety, safety would weigh in favor of imposing state tort law.
146
Thomas S. Deibert, Recent Decision: Products Liability – The Third Circuit Extends Scope of Immunity Provided
by Federal Government Contractor Defense, 67 TEMP. L. REV. 1421, 1435–36 (1994).

25

remanded, suggesting that strong policy concerns could later be raised once the facts were
revisited. 147 A failure to provide strong policy concerns in this case should not be viewed as
meaning none could ever exist outside of the national security concerns implicated by military
affairs.
B. Additional federal interests
The previous section and related cases focused primarily on the application of Boyle
outside a military procurement context, while the following case discusses federal interests that
were not contemplated by the Supreme Court in Boyle, but are nonetheless compelling. McCue
v. City of New York involved injuries sustained by construction workers, firefighters, policeman,
and others involved in cleaning up the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks. 148 In their
complaint, the parties alleged that they contracted respiratory diseases resulting from the
exposure to toxic fumes and gases. 149 The Second Circuit used the federal interest of
coordinating federal disaster relief as sufficient to justify the use of the government contractor
defense in favor of the defendants. 150 In addition, the court diverged from the Boyle analysis
even further in that it applied a unique statutory basis: The Stafford Act. 151 The Second Circuit
was concerned that imposing liability on those tasked with undertaking cleanup initiatives led by
federal agencies would cause those entities to disregard orders of those federal agencies for fear
of being exposed to liability. 152 The McCue court modified the Boyle test to apply to the
particular circumstances. According to the test, a government contractor following the
instructions of a federal agency will be accorded immunity if: 1) the agency, in its discretion
147
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approved reasonably precise specifications regarding the management of a recovery site; 2) the
agency supervised and controlled an entity charged with implementing those specifications; and
3) the entity warned the agency about any dangers known to it but not the agency. 153 Ultimately
this court concluded that more facts would be needed and that summary judgment would not be
appropriate, but the court did acknowledge that the defense may be raised nonetheless. 154
VI. Applying Boyle outside the military context
The Supreme Court, as well as all circuits that have addressed the government contractor
defense after the Boyle decision, agree that the Boyle analysis requires two conditions to be met
in order to justify displacing state law. First, there must be a strong federal interest at stake if
state law were to be enforced. Second, there must be a significant conflict between federal
policy and state law. In this section the Comment will analyze these two conditions outside of
the military context and argue that courts are ultimately best suited for determining the
application of immunity beyond the federal government to the contactors whom they employ, as
Congress is ill-equipped to legislate in such a diverse and fact-intensive area of the law.
A. Strong Federal Interests
Despite its limiting interpretation of the Boyle decision, the Ninth Circuit recognized that
that there are potentially identifiable federal interests any time the government enters into a
contract with a third party contractor. 155 The Ninth Circuit’s main qualm with expansion of the
Boyle analysis was its doubt that federal interests would ever “significantly conflict” with state
law outside of the military context of the Boyle decision. The Third Circuit refutes the Ninth
Circuit most capably by simply acknowledging that while a significant conflict must exist, there
is nothing in the Supreme Court’s decision that would suggest that there are no federal interests
153
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outside a military context that can significantly conflict with state law for purposes of the Boyle
test. 156
A strong federal interest should be relatively easy to ascertain, especially within the
context of the FTCA, which aims, in part, to spare the government from expensive tort
liability. 157 Therefore, at the very least increased contract costs resulting from tort liability will
always pose a federal interest under this analysis. While this increased burden may be nothing
more than trivial at times, there are situations where the cost of tort litigation would result in a
significant financial burden on the government, therefore impairing its ability to enter into
contracts with parties who fear indemnification. 158 This burden is most palpable when the
effects of increased contract costs both small and large are viewed cumulatively. One important
concern with this analysis is that a universally bright-line test like the Boyle test would burden
innocent third parties who have sustained injuries related to the work done under contract with
the government no matter the cost of that particular case while immunizing contractors in all
cases where the test is met. 159
Other examples of strong federal interests with respect to the government contractor
defense have been posed since the Supreme Court’s Boyle decision. One such example is the
interest proposed by the Second Circuit in McCue to coordinate federal disaster relief. 160 The
federal government is the only entity substantial enough to be tasked with coordinating national
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disaster relief in a country that is composed of largely independent states. When disasters on the
scale of September 11th, Hurricane Sandy, and Hurricane Katrina befall the United States, the
federal government holds a unique position in providing aid and coordinating relief efforts,
particularly when such disasters spread beyond the borders of a single state. It is difficult,
however, to conceive of a sustainable system where the federal government is tasked with
handling these duties entirely by itself, without the aid of private parties who would otherwise be
reluctant to provide assistance for fear of any judicial repercussions. 161 Even when private
parties agree to this kind of work, the possibility of second-guessing government orders would
prove disastrous in a situation where the ability to quickly control and coordinate work is
essential.
Carole A. Loftin provides another example of a strong federal interest in her note entitled
Expansion of the Government Contractor Defense: Applying Boyle to Vaccine Manufacturers. 162
Her stated federal interest is combating serious childhood disease. 163 Loftin proposes that
manufactures of the DTP vaccine 164 be allowed the defense and be immune from tort liability
stemming from the distribution and use of the vaccine. 165 Loftin astutely perceives the unique
role of the federal government in this context: “[D]iseases… present a serious and continuing
threat to public welfare, they do not respect state borders.” 166 This argument is further buttressed
through use of Article I Section 8 of the constitution, which grants Congress the power to
provide for the general welfare of the United States. 167 Should these vaccine manufacturers be
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susceptible to tort liability, production would suffer, as would the government’s ability to
provide for the general welfare of the United States. 168 This therefore serves as another example
for why contractor immunity is so crucial in areas where strong federal interests exist. As such,
it should be clear that serious and significant federal interests exist outside of the realm of
military procurement.
B. Significant Conflicts
As was made evident in its Boyle decision, the Supreme Court clearly requires that there
be a conflict of federal policy and state law significant enough to justify displacing that state
law. 169 Courts agree on this point. Courts do, however, disagree as to what amounts to a
significant conflict. 170 The Supreme Court in Boyle concluded that there was a significant
conflict because state law would upset discretionary governmental functions. 171 The Court’s
decision here to reject Feres as the grounds for finding a significant conflict cannot be
overlooked, especially when arguing whether the Boyle test applies outside of a military
framework. 172 What has been paramount in subsequent applications Boyle is the effect that
imposition of state law would have on the discretionary functions of the federal government.
Whether one is concerned with the financial burdens imposed on the government, or the
possibility of third party or judicial second-guessing of government contracts, the true underlying
concern is whether the federal government will be able to maintain discretion with respect to its
contracts. There is nothing in this analysis that would require application of Feres principles, or
involvement with the military, as the Ninth Circuit would suggest.
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The most difficult aspect of these cases has always been the factual application of the
defense to particular circumstances. Even straightforward application of the FTCA has proven
difficult in terms of ascertaining when the government is working in a discretionary capacity. 173
Nevertheless, it is clear that a significant conflict will exist whenever there is discord between
state law and the discretionary functions of the federal government. For this reason alone, it
seems apparent that Boyle should apply outside a military framework. As such, when an
appropriate case presents itself, the Supreme Court should resolve the current circuit split in
favor of application outside of a military context.
C. Modifying the third prong of the government contractor defense
The test for governmental immunity should be modified in order to better reflect the fact
that innocent third parties are ultimately the ones who will bear the full costs of injuries sustained
in relation to the contracts contemplated by the defense. 174 This is perhaps the biggest criticism
and most disconcerting aspect of the government contractor defense, as the faultless injured are
unable to seek recompense from the parties responsible for their injuries. In consideration of this
inherent inequity, the third prong of the test should be changed from requiring contractors to
inform the government of “known dangers” to requiring the contractors to inform the
government of dangers that they knew about or “should have known” about.
This altered language would better reflect negligence principles as this modified prong
would require the contractor to perform its due diligence in learning about the dangers of the
product to be fabricated or service to be performed. It would impose a duty on contractors to
uncover defects and dangers where they would otherwise be content to perform the work at hand
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and warn of dangers only if they are actually and presently known. 175 As the test currently
stands, it makes an assumption that the government itself is just as knowledgeable as those it
contracts with in terms of the dangers involved with the products or services that it seeks. 176 In
reality, while the government is more than able to dictate design requirements or cleanup
operations providing for little or no contractor discretion, the fact is those who contract with the
government carry special knowledge and expertise that may put them in a position to potentially
know more about the risks involved. The effect of this modified test would be to give innocent
third parties a chance at recovery in situations where a contractor is truly negligent.
It must be emphasized that this modification of Boyle’s third prong ensures that the
government will gain the benefit of contractor expertise by requiring these entities to perform
their due diligence. This benefit, however, will come with associated costs, as due diligence
necessarily entails further expense on the part of the contractor. The added cost of due diligence,
which would theoretically be passed onto the government through heightened contract cost,
would still be negligible in comparison to subjecting these government contractors to liability.
This is especially true when the nature of the contractor’s work is inherently dangerous, and the
risk of tort litigation, and by extent insurance cost, is reflectively high. It has been suggested that
a contractor’s liability, or an insurer’s ability to predict contractor liability, can play a critical
role in the determination of whether or not that contractor will participate or even stay in the
public marketplace. 177 Because liability plays a central role in contractor decision-making, one
could conclude that heightened contract costs through due diligence would pale in comparison to
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contract costs raised to insure against tort liability. For this reason, the FTCA’s aim of reducing
costs on the government would still not be frustrated.
Due diligence does pose other potential problems. In the event that a contractor’s due
diligence does uncover potential risks with a particular product or service, one may wonder if the
contractor would bother to disclose these risks, or if the contractor would bother to take the
contract at all. With respect to the first issue, it must be remembered that this altered third prong
still requires the contractor to inform the government of dangers that it should have known about
in order to gain the benefit of immunity; it would not be enough for the contractor to simply
uncover these dangers and then not disclose them. With respect to the second issue, the point of
the government contractor defense is to supply immunity to contractors who are tasked with
assuming contracts that are sometimes as dangerous as they are lucrative. In order to maintain
governmental discretion with such work, immunity must be conferred on those tasked with
performing the work. With such immunity granted, the profits associated with the contract
would serve as a sufficient incentive. 178
D. Why the courts should handle questions of contractor immunity
As has been made clear in Part IV of this Comment, Boyle is often criticized as offending
separation of powers principles in that it puts unelected court officials in the role of the
lawmakers. In reality, however, the courts are best situated to handle questions of contractor
immunity. It is crucial that the reader remember that a court’s Boyle analysis is almost always
going to be framed by reference to a relevant statute, most likely the FTCA, as the source
conferring immunity and creating significant conflict. Congress is bombarded by the requests of
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contractors to amend laws to confer immunity in their favor. 179 Most of the time these
contractors will be working out of pure self-interest and it should therefore come as no surprise
that Congress has been reluctant to legislate on their behalf. It would be an insurmountable
obstacle for Congress to consider and then legislate on the notion of conferring immunity on a
contractor in so many different contexts and contracts. Instead, Congress should enact general
acts that confer immunity on the government, as it has done with the FTCA, and leave the
interpretation and application of its will to the courts, who have historically been concerned with
notions of equity and fairness, and who are equipped to handle application of the law to
particular facts or contexts.
Admittedly courts have little expertise when it comes to government contracts or
procurement, and it has been argued that for this reason Congress is best equipped to handle
“fashioning an appropriate government contractor rule”, as it has the “time, resources, and
institutional capacity” to do so. 180 But this narrow view makes the assumption that expertise is
required to effectively shape, and more importantly apply, an adequate rule governing contractor
immunity. Contract and procurement expertise should not be viewed as a necessary requisite for
the courts to be able to adequately address the kinds of issues raised in Boyle. It is the federal
government and those it contracts with that ultimately carry the relevant expertise, and it is the
courts that should be tasked with heeding this expertise and applying it in a fair and impartial
way, much as they would in cases of medical malpractice where courts must rely heavily on the
testimony of experts. As a political body, Congress cannot adequately or impartially address the
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need to confer governmental immunity on contractors who operate largely out of self-interest. 181
Unlike Congress, courts are not political institutions, and would not thusly be limited.
VII. Conclusion
The long and conflicted history of the government contractor defense put the Supreme
Court in a position to settle what could only be viewed as over 150 years of loosely applied
federal common law in its Boyle decision. The majority in that case created a defense that was
not only consistent with separation of power principles, but was also representative of federalism
ideals and was a valid creation of federal common law. Unfortunately that somewhat ambiguous
decision resulted in more confusion, which has since led to a circuit split that the Supreme Court
should evenrually resolve in favor of clear expansion of the defense beyond the realm of military
procurement contracts. The Supreme Court should acknowledge the viewpoints of those who
fear further expansion of the defense, however, and remember that the interests of innocent third
party tort victims are at stake. By modifying the test set out in Boyle to require contractors to
warn the government not only of dangers it knows, but dangers it should have known, the
Supreme Court would be able to finally achieve a defense that better balances the protection of
these third parties with the strong federal interests at stake.
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